INFORMATIVE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVENESS OF LEGAL PERMISSION
Abstract and keywords
Abstract (English):
Despite of the definitions of human rights commonly used in the legal science it’s not reasonable to relate them to possibilities - statements with alethic modality. The compromise relation of human rights to deontic possibilities is unreasonable due to violation of the principle of monosemanticity of the notion, unjustified changing of the meaning and sense of special scientific terminology, as well as creation of illusion of semblance of interidentifying alethic and deontic modality. Attribution of the informative status of “permission” to the human rights reveals a number of problems. Analytically created element of any norm such as an authority (developer of the norm) is particularly important in the context of arguing about legal permissions. But in secular concepts of human rights discussions of the person creating permission comes into conflict with the idea of human rights which can’t be granted, which are natural and inherent. Considering denial of permission we should comment on the variant of its interpretation. Analyzing existing variants we get 6 meanings of the statement “not allowed (some type of behavior)”. The denial of normative operator in defining permissions, obligations and prohibitions creates the following definition of the principle of deontic fullness: “each type of behavior is either prohibited, or obligatory, or (in the context of normative regulation) neutral”. The given definition provides the basis for specific understanding of different types of legal regimes.

Keywords:
2001
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References

1. Matuzov N. I., Mal'ko A. V. Teoriya gosudarstva i prava. M.: Yurist', 2000.

2. Prava cheloveka: uchebnik dlya vuzov / otv. red. E. A. Lukasheva. M., 2001.

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